In Maharashtra, the government loves calamities

The Comptroller and Auditors General’s (CAG) audit report for Maharashtra tabled on the floor of the state legislature on 18 April has scrutinised the post-flood disaster relief expenditure in the year 2005 and 2006. Performance audit of the expenditure on preparedness for flood and relief and rehabilitation to the flood victims indicated that the level of preparedness of flood was not adequate; relief assistance was extended without proper identification of affected persons, financial management was deficient and monitoring of relief and rehabilitation activities was unsatisfactory.

But this audit has also gone a step beyond just reporting the financial irregularities, by training a lens on the causes of floods turning out to be disasters. It shows how multi purpose projects – where one purpose is flood control – will fail to insure people against flood disasters unless our planners integrate thinking on drainage and upstream-downstream linkages.

No lessons were learnt from flood disaster of 2005, and the VHF system in Nanded and Sangli district – and three talukas of Kolhapur district - was found non functional during the subsequent flood disaster of 2006.

In urban residential areas, rain water doesn’t run off easily s it does creating rivulets in the countryside. Stormwater drains provide the way out to water that would otherwise clog the tarred streets and concreted floors.

Pre-monsoon drainage cleaning exercises need to be carried out to ensure that stormwater drains would discharge drainwater upto their designed capacity.

• Willful breaking of Narmada promises

• Drains that dewater exchequer

Although the model action plan prepared by Union Government in 1981 had laid down the importance of cleaning of drainage passing through residential areas regularly well before the onset of monsoon, the CAG’s audit scrutiny found that in none of the ten Maharashtra districts - where audit review was carried out - instructions for drainage cleaning were issued from the administrative departments to the district authorities and local bodies.

Even after the flood disaster of July-August 2005, long-term plans aimed at desiltation of rivers, improvement of drainage system were not done in any districts except Mumbai. In the case of Mumbai, on recommendations of the government’s fact-finding Madhavrao Chitale committee, desiltation and widening of Mumbai’s Mithi river was carried out. But even here, CAG could not ascertain the claim by the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority, of having excavated 12.96 lakh cubic metres of silt/debris/rock from the river. There were no records available on measurement of stack at dumping sites or on the transportation of silt.

Furthermore, the state level Disaster Management Plan had assigned the responsibility jointly to district authorities and Reservoir Engineers of Water Resources Dept for keeping a vigil on the water levels in reservoirs and monitoring outflows (downstream releases) effectively with enough warning to the people downstream. But the audit found out that the water levels in all dams – including Karnataka’s Almatti dam – were not monitored during the 2005 monsoon.

In 2000, the Supreme Court allowed the full reservoir level (FRL) of the Almatti Dam to go upto 519.60 metres while expecting the issue of submergence due to be adjudicated by a competent tribunal. Clearance for raising storage level was accordingly given by the Central Water Commission and Planning Commission subject to the condition that the Government of Karnataka regulate the water storage level by discharging sufficient water, that there would not be any submergence in the territory of Maharashtra.

But in monsoon-2005, the Karnataka government did not care to pre-deplete the reservoir for avoiding submergence in Maharashtra till 31 July 2005. Water storage due to heavy rainfall had reached the FRL of 519.60 metres on 26 July 2005 itself. Yet, Maharashtra authorities wrote the first letter to their Karnataka counterparts for releasing water from Almatti Dam only on 3 August 2005, after Sangli got flooded fully.

From 31 July 2005, Karnataka had started releasing water and the reservoir level went down to 517.20 metres on 4 August 2005. During this time, Sangli remained under prolonged submergence for seven to eight days, mainly due to the backwater effect of the Almatti dam. This had affected many families to whom the Maharashtra government had granted relief assistance of Rs. 58.78 crores. This could have been avoided, had the conditions of clearance for the Almatti dam been followed by keeping close vigil on water levels. (Additional submergence in the upstream areas over and above the reservoir area at FRL is called the backwater effect.)

Separate from the CAG audit of Maharashtra, there are also questions on whether backwater submergence effect is estimated and shown along with the displacement from dam projects.

In the case of Narmada Sagar Dam, the backwater effect and resultant submergence was only estimated after the Jabalpur High Court issued directives for the same.

Similar concerns have existed in the case of Sardar Sarovar Project. The Narmada Valley Development Authority in Madhya Pradesh did not know the submergence due to backwater effects, according to a report in the publication Dams, Rivers and People.

• Willful breaking of Narmada promises

• Drains that dewater exchequer

According to recent reports in Afternoon Maharashtra, state legislators led by Legislative Council chairman, Shivajirao Deshmukh met on 11 June to discuss action to the prevent Almatti debacle this year, by talking to Karnataka. It remains to be seen whether that will actually happen.

Continuing with the audit report, the improprieties in Maharashtra are endless. Very High Frequency sets (VHF sets) for use in warning systems were not in place in Mumbai, Parbhani and Raigad districts and were found out of order in places where they were available during the flood of 2005. It was observed that 53 out of 69 VHF sets installed in four districts 1998-‘99, were not functioning since 2003-‘04 for want of maintenance and repairs. No lessons were learnt from flood disaster of 2005, and the VHF system in Nanded and Sangli district – and three talukas of Kolhapr district - was found non functional during the subsequent flood disaster of 2006.

While scrutinising the relief expenditure, the CAG examined cases involving Rs. 500 crore - out of total Rs.780 crores spent on relief in the year 2005 – and found that nearly 43 percent of the amount was spent without proper documents on records. Relief expenditure next year has noticed a better performance with just 19 percent of amount being wrongfully spent.

The final irony is that the audit also has shown an instance on how everyone seems to love a good calamity. In Kadegaon taluka of Sangli district, farmers had received Rs.5.80 crores as compensation for crop loss due to heavy rains. According to norms decided by the meteorological department, a rain of above 125 mm in a single day is classified as a heavy rain, whereas Kadegaon town had reported only 75 mm rainfall and neighbouring villages only 65 mm.